Participatory Constitution-Making as a Transnational Legal Norm: Why Does It “Stick” in Some Contexts and Not in Others? by Saati, Abrak
UC Irvine Journal of International, Transnational, and
Comparative Law
Volume 2 Symposium: Transnational Elements of
Constitution-Making Article 7
3-1-2017
Participatory Constitution-Making as a
Transnational Legal Norm: Why Does It “Stick” in
Some Contexts and Not in Others?
Abrak Saati
Umeå University
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uci.edu/ucijil
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UCI Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in UC Irvine Journal of
International, Transnational, and Comparative Law by an authorized editor of UCI Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Saati, Abrak (2017) "Participatory Constitution-Making as a Transnational Legal Norm: Why Does It “Stick” in Some Contexts and
Not in Others?," UC Irvine Journal of International, Transnational, and Comparative Law: Vol. 2, 113.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uci.edu/ucijil/vol2/iss1/7
113
Participatory Constitution-Making as a 
Transnational Legal Norm: Why Does It 
“Stick” in Some Contexts and Not in 
Others?
Abrak Saati∗
It could be argued that since the dawn of the peace-building era in the 
early 1990s, public participation in constitution-making processes has 
developed into a transnational legal norm. International organizations, 
NGOs, CSOs, scholars and think tanks around the globe repeatedly stress 
the value of including ordinary citizens in the making of their founding laws. 
As a consequence, the practice of participatory constitution-making has also 
increased. Though this is a seemingly established transnational legal norm, 
it is still a norm that has been more or less successfully adopted in different 
contexts. This article takes an interest in exploring why this is so. How is 
it that this norm is institutionalized in some contexts, internalized in others, 
institutionalized and internalized in yet other contexts, and simply rejected 
in still other contexts? 
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INTRODUCTION
Much has happened since James Tully stated that constitution-making is the 
single activity in “modern politics that has not been democratized” over the last 
three centuries.1 To be sure, over the past twenty-five years, the common perception 
of constitution-making as something reserved for political elites and lawyers to 
deliberate behind closed doors, the exclusive domain of the chosen few without 
public insight, has been seriously challenged. In the wake of former UN Secretary 
General Boutros-Ghali’s two influential reports, An Agenda for Peace2 and An Agenda 
for Democratization3, constitution-making with the assistance of ordinary women and 
men has become part of a broader peace-building agenda. Engaging ordinary 
citizens in the process is envisioned to establish, promote and strengthen 
democratic institutions and, in consequence, bring lasting peace and stability to 
post-conflict states and states in transition from authoritarian rule. Because of this, 
there has been an upsurge of what is now commonly referred to as participatory 
constitution-making.4 Across the globe, in post-conflict states and in states in 
transition from authoritarianism in Africa, Europe, Latin America, the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) region, and Southeast Asia, ordinary people have been 
invited to voice their opinions and convey their aspirations as to what they believe 
to be important to include in their country’s founding laws as they move away from 
violent conflict and/or authoritarianism. 
In this article, I argue that participatory constitution-making in post-conflict 
states and in states in transition from authoritarian rule has by now become 
something more than just a “trend.” I believe that it can be argued that it is, or at 
least that it is starting to, develop into a transnational legal norm and that the 
international community has been, and continues to be, important for the 
promotion of this particular norm. I have, in a previous study, theorized 
participation in constitution-making, and have suggested that we must approach this 
notion in a more analytically sharp and distinct way so as to be able to differentiate 
between different types of participation in terms of how much influence the public 
has been allowed to exert on the constitution through their so called participation.5
This is important because as things stand today, scholars and practitioners alike 
convey reference to public participation in a manner that many times suggests that 
1.  JAMES TULLY, STRANGE MULTIPLICITY: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AN AGE OF DIVERSITY
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1995). 
2.  U.N. Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and 
Peacekeeping, U.N. Doc. A/47/277-S/24111 (June 17, 1992). 
3.  U.N. Secretary-General, An Agenda for Democratization, U.N. Doc. A/51/761 (Dec. 20, 1996). 
4.  MICHELE BRANDT ET AL., CONSTITUTION MAKING AND REFORM: OPTIONS FOR THE 
PROCESS (2011); ANDREW LADLEY, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY AND 
ELECTORAL ASSISTANCE, CONSTITUTION BUILDING AFTER CONFLICT: EXTERNAL SUPPORT TO A 
SOVEREIGN PROCESS (2011); See, e.g., Todd A. Eisenstadt et al., When Talk Trumps Text: The 
Democratizing Effects of Deliberation during Constitution-Making 1974-2011, 109(3) AM. POL. SCI. REV. 592 
(2015). 
5.  Abrak Saati, The Participation Myth: Outcomes of Participatory Constitution Building Processes on 
Democracy 123-24 (2015), http://umu.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:809188/FULLTEXT01.pdf. 
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the practice of it is similar wherever it takes place. This could not be further from 
the truth. 
If we were to imagine a scale of participation in constitution-making processes, 
we would, at the bottom of the scale, find cases that have involved minimal public 
input: cases in which “participation” has been a mere act of window-dressing and 
where the general public has not been allowed to influence the content of the 
constitution even in the least.6 Higher up on the scale, on the other hand, we would 
find cases in which public participation in the constitution-making process has been 
extensive in the sense that the general public has been provided opportunities to 
actually influence the content of the constitution.7 Between these two opposites on 
the scale, we would find a number of different types/in-between cases in which 
participation has varied as to the extent of influence participants have been allowed 
to exert on the content of the constitutional draft.8
These differences of participation in practice suggest that the norm of 
participatory constitution-making for some reason, or for some reasons, “sticks” 
better in some contexts than in others. In some contexts, the norm is rejected 
altogether – national governments do not seem interested at all in adopting the 
norm and in including their population in the making of the constitution, not even 
in a cosmetic sense. In other contexts, the norm is at least institutionalized, meaning 
that the norm is incorporated into law. In these instances we find domestic 
legislation that stipulates that the public are to be consulted in the making of the 
constitution. The extent to which these words transcend the paper on which they 
are written and are effectively implemented is, however, a different matter. Finally 
there are contexts in which the norm is both institutionalized and internalized. This 
means that national governments live up to their rhetorical claims of wanting to 
include the citizenry, fully institutionalize the norm and comply with it—leading to 
the general public being able to effectively participate, by exerting influence on the 
draft, in the making of their constitution. 
These differences of norm diffusion are intriguing and they beg the question: 
Why? Why do some countries reject this norm whereas it is institutionalized without 
any actual effect in others, and both institutionalized and internalized in yet others? 
Why and how do transnational legal norms, such as participatory constitution-
making, travel? These questions constitute the focal point of attention in this article. 
Although this is primarily a conceptual article that sets out to understand this 
particular transnational legal norm—participatory constitution-making—and how 
6.  Such was the case in the Iraqi constitution making process that resulted in the 2005 
constitution as well as the Nigerian constitution making process that resulted in the 1999 constitution. 
See Saati, supra note 5. Such was the case in the Iraqi constitution making process that resulted in the 
2005 constitution as well as the Nigerian constitution making process that resulted in the 1999 
constitution (see e.g Saati 2015). 
7.  Such was the case in the Kenyan constitution making process of 2009-2010. See id.
8. See Saati, supra note 5, at 86-108 for an exhaustive account of different types of participation 
in constitution-making processes and a categorization of twenty empirical cases illustrating how 
participation and the extent of influence granted to participants greatly differs between cases. 
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it can be diffused into domestic contexts, it also draws on empirical examples for 
purposes of illustrating differences as far as successful/unsuccessful norm diffusion 
is concerned. The empirical examples are also useful for being able to draw tentative 
conclusions as to why this norm appears to “stick” better in some contexts than in 
others. The article is organized as follows: I proceed with a discussion of whether 
or not a case can even be made for participatory constitution-making evolving into 
a transnational legal norm after which I trace this potential development. The article 
then moves on to a theoretical discussion concerning how norms diffuse, and in 
this context, I also discuss what is actually needed for a norm to transcend mere 
institutionalization to also become internalized. In the final section of the article, 
conclusions are discussed. 
PARTICIPATORY CONSTITUTION-MAKING - IS IT AN EVOLVING 
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL NORM?
In order to understand if participatory constitution-making is a transnational 
legal norm, or if there are indications of it developing into a transnational legal 
norm, what is meant by the concept must first be established. In sorting this out, 
theory of transnational legal orders is useful. Now, what does transnational legal 
order (TLO) imply? In their edited volume, Halliday and Shaffer provide the 
following definition of a TLO.9 They state that a TLO is: “a collection of formalized 
legal norms and associated organizations and actors that authoritatively order the 
understanding and practice of law across national jurisdictions.”10 Transnational 
legal norms, in turn, “embody prescriptions for the regulation of activities in 
particular functional domains,” and they provide actors with tools and models so 
that they are able to redesign institutional arrangements such to address specific 
situations.11 The source, or sources, behind transnational legal norms can be 
different, ranging from international treaties to foreign legal models that are 
endorsed by transnational actors.12 In addition to providing definitional clarity to 
the concept of a transnational legal norm, Shaffer also makes a useful analytical 
distinction between the concepts of transnational law, legal norms, legal processes 
and legal orders, and argues that “transnational law consists of legal norms that are 
exported and imported across borders, and which involve transnational networks 
9.  Terence C. Halliday & Gregory C. Shaffer, Transnational Legal Orders, in TRANSNATIONAL 
LEGAL ORDERS 5 (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory C. Shaffer eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2015). 
10.  By authoritative, the authors refer to the “acceptance of the legal norms as reflected in law’s 
understanding and practice.” Id. at 6. 
11.  Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Processes and State Change: Opportunities and Constraints, 37 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 229, 238 (2012); GREGORY SHAFFER, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESSES 
AND STATE CHANGE: OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS 15 (2012). Gregory Shaffer, Transnational 
Legal Processes and State Change: Opportunities and Constraints at 15, Legal Stud. Res. Paper Series, Res. Paper 
No. 10-28. Univ. of Minn. Law School (2012). 
12.  Id. at 232-33. 
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and international and regional institutions that help to construct and convey the 
legal norm within a field of law.”13
When it comes to participatory constitution-making, there are indications that 
suggest that it has developed into a transnational legal norm since the notion as 
such, as well as its practice is, in fact, being exported and imported across national 
borders. However, it is not entirely accurate that the norm is firmly established as a 
transnational legal norm in the sense that it embodies clear prescriptions as to how
the general public is to be involved in the making of their constitution. Though 
engaging the public in the making of their founding laws appears to be a trend that 
is here to stay, there are no exact rules, guidelines or clearly formulated prescriptions 
for during what stage of the process, to what extent, and with what amount of 
influence on the final draft the general public is to be involved. Also, the spread of 
this norm, though transnational in some sense of the word, is still not universal14 as 
it is primarily directed towards post-conflict states and states in transition from 
authoritarian rule, not towards stable democracies. This is an important note to 
make: public participation is developing into a core norm for constitution-making, 
not universally but specifically, for countries that find themselves in a post-conflict 
state or in a transition from authoritarianism. By consequence, this implies that this 
norm is most commonly expressed by different types of international organizations 
or international institutes towards post-conflict states or states in transition from 
authoritarian rule (i.e., this is a norm that is being downloaded from international to 
domestic law).15 The fact that the norm of directly engaging the public in the making 
of their constitution is, in some contexts, enforced from a higher standing authority 
(either an international treaty or an agent such as, for example, the United Nations) 
rather than from actors/organizations or institutions from the domestic 
environment, can perhaps serve to partly explain why it is not always successfully 
internalized in the recipient context (i.e., that there is a mismatch between the norm 
of participatory constitution-making endorsed from an outside force that does not 
fully resonate with existing domestic norms).16 I will return to and discuss this 
particular issue further below. For now, we shall direct our attention to analyzing 
the sources behind the development of participatory constitution-making processes 
13.  Id. at 233. 
14.  I would hence not agree with Franck and Thiruvengadam’s view that involving the people 
in the process of constitution-making is a worldwide trend. See Thomas M. Franck and Arun K. 
Thiruvengadam, Norms of International Law Relating to the Constitution-Making Process, in FRAMING THE 
STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION: CASE STUDIES IN CONSTITUTION MAKING 3, 10 (Laurel E. Miller 
& Louis Aucoin eds., 2010); See also, HALLIDAY AND SHAFFER, supra note 9 (in regards to this issue 
Halliday and Shaffer also make a useful point of separating “global” law from “transnational” law. 
“Global” law suggests exactly that; that the law, or the legal norm, in question has global reach, while 
transnational law (or the legal norm in question) captures the phenomenon of legal ordering that goes 
beyond the nation-state but that does not necessary diffuse to all parts of the globe). 
15.  See Harold H. Koh, Why Transnational Law Matters, 24 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 745 (2006) 
(for a useful operationalization of transnational law). 
16.  See, e.g., Shaffer, supra note 11. 
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into a transnational legal norm. As noted by Alldén17 and echoed by Halliday and 
Shaffer18, transnational legal norms do not travel by themselves, rather they 
originate from somewhere after which they are conveyed by different actors, such 
as international actors, domestic political elites and/or agents within civil society 
organizations. 
Normative Understandings of the Benefits of Direct Citizen Engagement in Political Decision-
Making
If we were to trace the ideas of direct citizen involvement not only in 
constitution-making but in political decision making in general, we would inevitably 
come across the writings of classical liberal theorists such as Mill19 and Rousseau.20
To reiterate and analyze the complete set of arguments that these authors have 
emphasized in support of citizen involvement in matters of public relevance would 
require a full-length article solely devoted to this matter, and this article is not the 
place to provide such an analysis. Suffice it to say that much of their work, as well 
as the writings of contemporary participation theorists such as Pateman,21
Arnstein,22 Radcliff and Wingenbach,23 Mutz24 and Finkel25 to name a few, spring 
from a highly normative understanding of public participation as something that 
ought to be pursued due to a number of perceived beneficial effects primarily for the 
individual who is engaging in the act of participation26, but also because of perceived 
positive outcomes at the macro level of analysis.27 Over the course of years, and 
particularly from the beginning of the 1990s and the ushering in of the peace-
building era, this normative understanding has also made its way into official policy 
documents of international organizations in which it is often stressed that public 
participation is more than the involvement of recipients of aid in the 
17.  Susanne Alldén, How Do International Norms Travel? Women’s Political Rights in Cambodia and 
Timor-Leste 21-23 (2009), https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:274281/FULLTEXT01.pdf. 
18.  HALLIDAY & SHAFFER, supra note 9, at 26-31. 
19.  JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1873). 
20.  JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND THE DISCOURSE ON THE 
ORIGIN AND FOUNDATION OF INEQUALITY AMONG MANKIND (Lester G. Crocker 1967). 
21.  See generally CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1970). 
22.  Sherry R. Arnstein, A Ladder of Citizen Participation, 35 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 216 (1969). 
23.  Benjamin Radcliff and Ed Wingenbach, Preference Aggregation, Functional Pathologies, and 
Democracy: A Social Choice Defense of Participatory Democracy, 62 J. POL. 4 (2000). 
24.  Diana C. Mutz, Cross-cutting Social Networks: Testing Democratic Theory in Practice, 96 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 111 (2002). 
25.  Steven E. Finkel, Can Democracy Be Taught?, 14 J. DEMOCRACY 137 (2003). 
26.  At the individual level of analysis, the educational merits of direct citizen participation in 
political decision-making are frequently brought to attention; participation in political decision-making 
as a way to educate people about democratic values and to support the growth of a democratic political 
culture in a society. See, e.g., PATEMAN, supra note 21; Arnstein, supra note 22). 
27.  See generally DEVRA C. MOEHLER, DISTRUSTING DEMOCRATS: OUTCOMES OF 
PARTICIPATORY CONSTITUTION MAKING (2008) (as people become more knowledgeable about the 
political system when they directly engage in political decision-making, social capital is also envisioned 
to be built. This will in turn lead to more support for government institutions, which will make people 
feel a stronger bond to democratic principles). 
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implementation of projects. Rather, public participation should be understood as a 
development strategy in its own right that serves to strengthen local ownership.28
This development has in turn been a response to failed, or at least broadly perceived 
as such, top-down approaches to development and peace-building.29 Hence, what 
we see here is a shift in ideas and conceptualizations as to how peace-building ought 
to be practiced, which has contributed to altering our understanding of how post-
conflict constitutions are to be produced as well. 
Since the early 1990s, public participation, not only in the arena of 
constitution-making but in general, is part of a broader development and peace-
building agenda that emphasizes “the local”30, “peace-building from below”31, and 
“grassroots peace-building.”32 And even though there are a few empirical examples 
of transitioning and/or post-conflict states that involved their respective 
populations in the making of the constitution prior to the 1990s33, the trend of 
participatory constitution-making has increased substantially from the 1990s and 
onwards. As Samuels has suggested, constitutional theory has traditionally focused 
on constitutions in stable political contexts and not on the importance of 
constitutions in times of transition.34 Also, among constitutional scholars, focus has 
traditionally been on the content of the constitution rather than on the process through 
which the constitution comes into being.35 From the onset of the peace-building 
28.  The 1993 Human Development Report, for example, states that: “Participation, from the 
human development perspective, is both a means and an end. Human development stresses the need 
to invest in human capabilities and then ensure that those capabilities are used for the benefit of all. 
Greater participation has an important part to play here: it helps maximize the use of human capabilities 
and is thus a means of increasing levels of social and economic development. But human development 
is also concerned with personal fulfillment. So, active participation, which allows people to realize their 
full potential and make their best contribution to society, is also an end in itself.” United Nations 
Development Programme, Human Development Report 1993 21-22 (1993). Similar passages can be 
found in the 2002 Human Development Report. 
29.  For a more thorough discussion about this, please be referred to Asim Ijaz Khwaya, Is
Increasing Community Participation Always a Good Thing? 2 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 427 (2004). 
30.  Roger Mac Ginty & Oliver P. Richmond, The Local Turn in Peace Building: A Critical Agenda 
for Peace, 34 THIRD WORLD Q. 763, 763 (2013). 
31.  OLIVER RAMSBOTHAM ET AL., CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT RESOLUTION 274 (4th ed. 
2016). 
32.  John Heathershaw, Unpacking the Liberal Peace: The Dividing and Merging of Peacebuilding 
Discourses, 36 J. INT’L STUD. 597, 619 (2008). 
33.  Uganda, for example, underwent a rather lengthy constitutional reform process (1988-1995) 
in which the general public were invited to participate. In Brazil as well, constitutional reform with 
broad based citizen engagement took place during the years 1987-1988. In Nicaragua, the public were 
invited to participate in the making of the constitution during the constitutional reform process that 
lasted during the years 1985-1987. In a way Guatemala can also be regarded as a case of participatory 
constitution-making that at least started in the 1980s but that, as part of the broader peace process, 
lasted up until 1999. 
34.  Kirsti Samuels, Postwar Constitution Building: Opportunities and Challenges, in THE DILEMMAS 
OF STATEBUILDING: CONFRONTING THE CONTRADICTIONS OF POSTWAR PEACE OPERATIONS 173, 
174 (Roland Paris & Timothy D. Sisk eds., 2009). 
35.  See generally Lakhdar Brahimi, Foreword, in CONSTITUTION MAKING AND REFORM:
OPTIONS FOR THE PROCESS i, i-iii (Michele Brandt et al., 2011); Yash Ghai & Guido Galli, Constitution 
Building Processes and Democratization, Int’l Inst. for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2006), 
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era, however, both of these concepts have changed: (i) the constitution has become 
a prioritized area of concern in post-conflict states and in states in transition from 
authoritarian rule, and (ii) the process of constitution-making has gained increased 
attention. It is in relation to the latter aspect that the importance of including 
ordinary citizens has been emphasized by scholars and practitioners alike.36
To summarize, it could be said that within the political science field, as well as 
the peace-building community, there is a long tradition, and a strong bias in favor 
of direct citizen involvement in political decision-making. This has, in turn, 
influenced our thinking about constitution-making processes to the extent that 
“participatory constitution-making” is by now—and particularly since the onset of 
the peace-building era—a recognized concept, as well as an established practice. As 
a result, the once deeply-rooted idea that constitution-making should be limited to 
the smoke-filled chambers of political elites, lawyers and policy makers is no longer 
the dominant understanding, no matter how technically sound the constitutional 
content of such an elite-driven process may be. 
With all this being said, it can still be discussed if it is accurate to refer to 
participatory constitution-making processes as a transnational legal norm (or as a 
developing transnational legal norm), or if it is rather, and only, a transnational 
political norm. Against the latter, there can be no serious objections. Public 
participation in politics is generally viewed as the defining element of democratic 
citizenship,37 and although “participation” is perhaps most often construed as 
participation in free and fair elections, the range of issues that the public can 
influence through their participation, of course, exceeds merely selecting 
government officials every four or five years. Among the range of issues, 
constitution-making can be included, which—in light of the upsurge of empirical 
cases of participatory constitution-making processes in various geographical 
locations around the globe—it also appears to be. Moreover, seeing how involving 
the public in the making of a constitution seems to have an appeal that it is not 
limited to one specific geographic area in the world, it would likely not be too 
farfetched to refer to participatory constitution-making as a transnational political 
http://iknowpolitics.org/sites/default/files/cbp_democratization_eng-2.pdf; Samuels, supra note 34; 
SUSANNA D. WING, CONSTRUCTING DEMOCRACY IN TRANSITIONING SOCIETIES IN AFRICA:
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DELIBERATION IN MALI (2008); Angela M. Banks, Challenging Political 
Boundaries in Post-Conflict States, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 105 (2007). 
36.  See, e.g., Samuels, supra note 34; Yash Ghai & Guido Galli, Constitution Building Processes and 
Democratization, Int’l Inst. for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2006), http://iknowpolitics.org 
/sites/default/files/cbp_democratization_eng-2.pdf; Angela M. Banks, Challenging Political Boundaries in 
Post-Conflict States, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 105 (2007); Lakhdar Brahimi, Foreword, in CONSTITUTION 
MAKING AND REFORM: OPTIONS FOR THE PROCESS, BRANDT ET AL., supra note 4, at 80-81; 
SUSANNA D. WING, CONSTRUCTING DEMOCRACY IN TRANSITIONING SOCIETIES IN AFRICA:
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DELIBERATION IN MALI (2008). 
37.  ROBERT A. DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY 37-39 (1998); see generally SIDNEY VERBA, KAY
LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN, & HENRY E. BRADY, VOICE AND EQUALITY: CIVIC VOLUNTARISM IN 
AMERICAN POLITICS (1995). 
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norm. However, it is still worthwhile discussing if it can also be considered a 
transnational legal norm. I turn to this issue below. 
Legal Justifications in Support of Participatory Constitution-Making 
In addition to normative reasons as to why ordinary people ought to be 
included in the making of their founding laws, there is a continuing debate 
concerning whether or not legal justifications can also be put forth in support of 
participatory constitution-making processes.38 Advocates of including the general 
public in the making of a constitution often refer to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and more specifically to article 25 of the 
ICCPR.39 Article 25 states that: “Every citizen shall have the right and the 
opportunity . . . to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through 
freely chosen representatives.”40 Aside from article 25 of the ICCPR, advocates also 
refer to article 21 of the UN Declaration of Human Rights (1948), which states that, 
“Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or 
through freely chosen representatives.”41 In a similar manner, article 5(c) of the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
has also been referred to, in which the right to take part in public affairs is 
established.42 The European Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities has also been invoked, in which article 15 settles that persons who belong 
to national minorities must be allowed to effectively participate in cultural, social 
and economic life as well as in public affairs.43 Adding to these international treaties, 
a number of regional charters also underscore the right to participate in public 
affairs. Examples include the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights of 
1981, the Commonwealths Harare Declaration of 1991, and the Asian Charter of 
Rights of 1998. 
Despite these legal instruments, two separate but related questions are relevant 
to consider. To begin with, one might ponder if constitution-making is in fact a prior
condition for citizens to participate in the governance of their country (either 
directly or through freely chosen representatives). If one would argue that such is 
the case, then public participation in the making of the constitution as such would 
38.  See generally Vivien Hart, Constitution Making and the Right to Take Part in a Public Affair, in
FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION: CASE STUDIES IN CONSTITUTION MAKING 20 
(Laurel E. Miller & Louis Aucoin eds., 2010). 
39.  See, id. (for a more thorough discussion and analysis of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and how the treaty provides legal justification for public participation in 
constitution-making). 
40.  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 25, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171. 
41.  G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 21, (Dec. 10, 1948). 
42.  International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 5c, 
Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. 
43.  Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and Explanatory Report 
art. 15, Feb. 1995. 
122 UC Irvine Journal of International, Transnational, amd Comparative Law [Vol. 2:113 
likely have to be precluded from the right to participate in governance.44 On the 
other hand, it could also be argued that since it is the constitution that establishes 
the rules of the political game and decides how and through which institutional 
forms the general public will be able to engage in the political process of their 
country, it is when the constitution is being produced that the public ought to have 
the possibility to voice their opinions. It could, indeed, be argued that this goes to 
the very heart of participating in governance. 
The other issue that deserves consideration is what to “take part” actually 
means in the context of constitution-making. Because even if article 25 of the 
ICCPR, article 21 of the UN Declaration of Human Rights, and article 5c of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination were 
unambiguous in supporting participation in constitution-making, “take part” is a 
vague formulation providing little guidance as to how it is or should be practiced. 
In order to “take part,” does it suffice to vote for members of a constitutional 
assembly whose members then have the responsibility of formulating the 
constitution? Or does “take part” include having the possibility to vote on a draft 
constitution? Or does “take part” perhaps involve receiving constitutional 
education in order to then be able to actively participate in the making of the 
constitution in an informed manner? Undeniably, the concept can be interpreted in 
different ways. As noted by Hart,45 the regional charters, international treaties, 
conventions and declarations, when taken together, influence and frame our view 
on meaningful participation in political affairs even though they are not specific as 
to what “take part” exactly means and even though they do not mention public 
participation in constitution-making specially either. Of course, the fact that 
participation in constitution-making is not mentioned explicitly also ties into the 
question of whether or not it is accurate to refer to participatory constitution-
making as a transnational legal norm. If one agrees with Shaffer’s understanding 
that transnational legal norms can encompass both soft as well as hard law,46 then 
participatory constitution-making could arguably be referred to as a transnational 
legal norm if one is at least willing to accept it as soft law. Rather, the issue concerns 
the fact that the legal aspects of the norm are so unclear that they fail to properly 
embody prescriptions for the regulation of how exactly participation in this 
particular domain is to take form, leading to vast differences at the domestic level 
when the norm is adopted.47
Since providing clarifications in international law that directly mention public 
participation in constitution-making might be a lengthy process, Hart suggests that 
it is now primarily a matter of seizing the momentum of including ordinary people 
in political decision-making in general to even further expand to the arena of 
44.  Hart, supra note 38, at 21. 
45.  Id. at 23. 
46.  See Shaffer, supra note 11, at 252. 
47.  See, e.g., Saati, supra note 5, at 307-18. 
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constitution-making,48 in a sense, to diffuse this norm further through international 
institutions and networks but also by practical experience. This leads us to a 
discussion of how norm diffusion is brought about and how a specific transnational 
legal norm is successfully adopted in some contexts and less successfully adopted 
in others. This is the area of concern in the following section.
HOW CAN NORMS BE DIFFUSED?
Though it is generally accepted today that norms matter, the issue is how 
norms diffuse and how they work their effects in the domestic arena. In this article, 
I argue that the international community—as part of a broader peace-building 
agenda—brings the norm of direct citizen participation in political decision-making 
in general, and in constitution-making in particular, into post-conflict states and 
states in transition from authoritarian rule. The UN, particularly through its 
Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA), the United States Institute of Peace 
(USIP), and the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
(IDEA), are important actors for the promotion of participatory constitution-
making processes in these types of contexts. The UN encourages this practice via 
interactions with actors at the domestic level who are then expected to understand, 
incorporate and conform to this norm. Hence, what we are currently observing is 
something that can be referred to as norm enforcement from above, alternatively vertical
norm diffusion.49 At the same time, these actors interact with domestic actors, meaning 
that they do not bring this norm into an empty void. Whether or not norm diffusion 
is successful depends on actors that operate on both of these levels. To be sure, 
international as well as domestic actors can be norm entrepreneurs. When it comes 
to actors within the domestic arena, a further distinction is also necessary to make, 
namely between national elites at the formal state level and the people at large/civil 
society.50 This distinction is needed because it is not unlikely that while a specific 
transnational legal norm is embraced by the people and by the civil society of a given 
state, it is not accepted by national elites.51 When it comes to participatory 
constitution-making specifically, there are some empirical cases that demonstrate 
this: The struggle for constitutional reform with broad based citizen engagement in 
Kenya, for example, was initially driven by elites within Kenya’s civil society.52 Their 
claims were, however, not met with sympathy from the ruling elite who had no 
interest in initiating a constitutional reform process that would most likely endanger 
their positions of power.53 The consistent efforts of Kenyan civil society actors did, 
48.  Hart, supra note 38, at 31. 
49.  Alldén, supra note 17; Koh, supra note 15, at 745-46. 
50.  See Trine Flockhart, Complex Socialization and the Transfer of Democratic Norms, in SOCIALIZING 
DEMOCRATIC NORMS: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION
OF EUROPE 43, 50-51 (Trine Flockhart ed., 2005). 
51.  Id.
52.  Alicia L. Bannon, Designing a Constitution-Drafting Process: Lessons from Kenya, 116 YALE L.J. 
1824, 1831 (2007). 
53.  Id. at 1831-32. 
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nevertheless, lead up to the 2001–2005 constitutional reform process, which was a 
highly participatory endeavor.54 The same holds true for the Zimbabwean 
constitutional reform process of 1999–2000. Just as in Kenya it was civil society 
organizations, and primarily the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), that 
insisted on a people-driven constitutional reform process even though the Mugabe 
regime was very much against it.55 In Colombia as well, it was primarily young 
people and student organizations that put constitutional reform with broad based 
public participation on the political agenda to begin with. This was in response to 
wide spread corruption and violence in the country during the 1980s. By mobilizing 
their efforts, these groups were successful in persuading both the sitting president, 
Virgilio Barco Vargas, and the Supreme Court of Justice to allow the Colombian 
citizenry to vote on the matter of establishing a constitutional assembly for 
subsequent constitutional reform.56 Indeed, the election for the constitutional 
assembly in December of 1990 was unique in the sense that it was the first time 
members to a constitutional body were not only representatives of established 
political parties but also representatives of a number of citizens’ constituencies and, 
perhaps more importantly, they were elected by universal suffrage.57 Though the 
subsequent steps of the Colombian constitution-making process were less 
successful in terms of ensuring the full participation of the general public, the efforts 
of the student organizations must still be acknowledged, as without their struggle, 
constitutional reform in the beginning of the 1990s might not even have taken place. 
Though these empirical examples capture instances of a particular norm being 
embraced by segments from the civil society sector of a given country, on a 
theoretical level, the opposite might of course also occur: that national elites 
embrace a specific norm while it is simultaneously rejected by the general public 
and/or domestic civil society organizations. 
In order to make us better understand the ways through which transnational 
legal norms can be diffused, and how it is, in fact, an interplay between the 
international and the domestic level, Harold Koh provides a useful analogy to 
computer-age descriptions.58 He says that the best operational definition of 
transnational law is the following: 
54.  See, e.g., Saati, supra note 5; see also Bannon, supra note 52, at 1832. 
55.  See Sara Rich Dorman, NGOs and the Constitutional Debate in Zimbabwe: From Inclusion to 
Exclusion, 29 J. OF S. AFR. STUD. 845, 848, 854-55 (2003); see also Muna Ndulo, Zimbabwe’s Unfulfilled 
Struggle for a Legitimate Constitutional Order, in FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION: CASE
STUDIES IN CONSTITUTION MAKING 176, 191-92 (Laurel E. Miller & Louis Aucoin eds., 2010). 
56.  Donald T. Fox, Gustavo Gallón-Giraldo, and Anne Stetson, Lessons of the Colombian 
Constitutional Reform of 1991: Toward the Securing of Peace and Reconciliation?, in FRAMING THE STATE IN 
TIMES OF TRANSITION: CASE STUDIES IN CONSTITUTION MAKING 467, 470-71 (Laurel E. Miller & 
Louis Aucoin eds., 2010). 
57.  Iván Marulanda, The Role of Constitution-Building Processes in Democratization: Case Study 
Colombia, Int’l Inst. for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2004), http://www.constitutionnet.org 
/files/cbp_colombia.pdf. 
58.  See generally Koh, supra note 15. 
2017] Participatory Constitution-Making as a Transnational Legal Norm 125 
(1) law that is downloaded from international to domestic law: for example, 
an international law concept that is domesticated or internalized into 
municipal law, such as the international human rights norm against 
disappearance, now recognized as domestic law in most municipal systems; 
(2) law that is “uploaded, then downloaded”: for example, a rule that 
originates in a domestic legal system, such as the guarantee of a free trial 
under the concept of due process of law in Western legal systems, which 
then becomes part of international law, as in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, and from there becomes internalized into nearly every legal system 
in the world, and (3) law that is borrowed or horizontally transplanted from 
one national system to another: for example, the “unclean hands” doctrine, 
which migrated from the British law of equity to many other legal 
systems.”59
In keeping with Koh’s definition, when it comes to participatory constitution-
making processes in post-conflict states and in states in transition from authoritarian 
rule, it is primarily a matter of the norm being downloaded from a higher standing 
authority (which signifies a vertical form of norm diffusion/norm diffusion from 
above, as discussed above) or that is it being horizontally transplanted from one 
national system to the other. As regards the first one of these modes, it is, as 
previously mentioned, mainly international organizations and institutions that 
encourage, and sometimes enforce, this norm upon post-conflict states and states 
in transition from authoritarian rule. For example, following its declaration of 
independence from Serbia in 2008, the leadership of Kosovo had no choice but to 
invite the population of the province in the making of the new constitution. This 
was because Kosovo had committed itself to the prescriptions in the Ahtisaari plan, 
which stipulated that a participatory constitution-making process was to be carried 
out.60 The Ahtisaari plan, though facing challenges of being approved in the UN 
Security Council due to Russia threatening to use its veto, was endorsed by an 
“international steering group” consisting of several countries, among which the US 
and the UK were included.61 The mandate of the steering group, in turn, was to 
support the full implementation of the Ahtisaari plan. Hence, in this specific case, 
the norm of participatory constitution-making was, in a sense, downloaded from a 
higher standing authority, or perhaps more accurately, enforced from above.62
59.  Id. at 745-56. 
60.  See generally U.N. Security Council, Comprehensive Proposal For the Kosovo Status Settlement, U.N. 
Doc. S/2007/168/Add.1 (Mar. 26, 2007). 
61.  The members of the “International Steering Group” were the UK, France, Germany, Italy, 
the US, Austria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Sweden, Turkey, Belgium, Denmark, Hungary, Slovenia 
and Switzerland, U.N. Security Council Report, Chronology of Events, Kosovo, http://www 
.securitycouncilreport.org/chronology/kosovo.php?page=all&print=true (last modified Feb. 2017). 
62.  It is, however, difficult to imagine that the extent of public input to the process can have 
been anything but limited since the time period between the declaration of independence (Feb. 17, 
2008) and the finalization of the public participation phase of the process was a mere fortnight (Mar. 2, 
2008); Saati, supra note 5, at 102. 
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With regard to norms that are horizontally transplanted, the norm of participatory 
constitution-making has indeed also travelled between different post-conflict states 
and between different states in transition from authoritarian rule. The South African 
constitution-making process of 1994–1996—frequently brought to attention for its 
highly participatory features—has, for example, become a reference point for many 
other countries that have set out to include their respective populations in the 
making of their constitution, and as such, constitutes a good example of how the 
norm is also horizontally exported.63
Regardless of a particular norm being downloaded or horizontally transplanted, it is 
a matter of rooting the norm in the recipient country which commonly implies that 
domestic actors reconstruct the norm so that it fits with existing norms and norm 
hierarchies——something that Acharya describes as a process of “localization.”64
Hence, norm diffusion is seldom a matter of downright rejecting a norm or 
wholeheartedly accepting a norm. A more nuanced understanding of how norms 
diffuse can perhaps be reached by acknowledging that domestic actors build 
congruence between transnational legal norms and local beliefs and practices.65 In 
consequence, in contexts where a specific norm does not successfully diffuse, the 
case might be that domestic actors have not been able (or allowed) to find a way to 
harmonize the norm with local norms and practices, leading merely to a symbolic 
acceptance of the norm, or to the norm being institutionalized but not internalized. 
Different Steps of “Norm Localization” 
Acharya envisions norm localization as something that occurs in several 
steps.66 The first step is that of prelocalization during which local actors might resist 
the new external norm because doubt/fear that it undermines local practices. The 
norm might however be localized if some domestic actors start to consider the 
external norm as something that could potentially strengthen already existing 
institutions. This line of reasoning finds resonance in Shaffer’s discussion about 
how transnational legal norms invariably depend on local supporters and perhaps 
primarily the support of domestic political elites.67 Acharya refers to the second step 
as local initiative. This stage of the localization process implies that local actors frame 
the external norm such that the value of it becomes clear to the local population. In 
order for the general population to accept the norm, it is also imperative that they 
63.  See, e.g., Hassen Ebrahim & Laurel E. Miller, Creating the Birth Certificate of a New South Africa: 
Constitution Making after Apartheid, in FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION: CASE STUDIES 
IN CONSTITUTION MAKING, 111, 112 (Laurel E. Miller with Louis Aucoin eds., 2010); Fink Haysom, 
Special Features and Mechanisms in Negotiating the South African Constitution, in CONSTITUTION-MAKING 
AND DEMOCRATISATION IN AFRICA, 93-113, 106-07 (Goran Hyden & Denis Venter eds., Afr. Inst. of 
S. Afr. 2001). 
64.  Amitav Acharya, How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional 
Change in Asian Regionalism, 58, INT. ORG. 213, 239-75 (2004).
65.  Id. at 240. 
66.  Id. at 251. 
67.  Shaffer, supra note 11, at 255. 
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do not view the domestic norm entrepreneurs who support the external norm as 
puppets of outside forces. The third stage that Acharya envisions in the localization 
process is that of adaptation. This implies that the external norm is reconstructed so 
that it agrees with local norms and practices at the same time as local norms are 
adjusted so that they find similarities with the external norm. This entails that the 
external norm is redefined and that local actors manage to relate it to already existing 
norms in the domestic environment; or that some parts of the external norm are 
accepted whereas other parts of it are simply rejected. The fourth and final stage is 
amplification and universalization which means that new instruments and practices are 
developed that include local influences. This aspect of the localization process finds 
echo in Risse and Sikkink’s discussion about moral consciousness-raising which 
implies that domestic actors, elites, and members from the civil society sector or 
domestic NGOs, try to convey the universality of the norm—by so doing, they try 
to evade arguments against the norm on the basis of it being alien to the culture and 
way of life in the norm-recipient country.68 This form of consciousness-raising can 
be done through a variety of techniques ranging from persuasion to actors invoking 
emotional appeals or presenting logically sound arguments. According to Risse and 
Sikkink moral consciousness-raising often also involves a process of “shaming.”69
This holds particular relevance when a norm-violating state does not adhere to 
human rights norms. States that do not comply with the norm are exiled from the 
group of “civilized states,” which is in turn expected to work as an incentive for 
norm-violators to change their behavior and be persuaded to conform to the human 
rights norm/norms. Once the ruling elite in the norm-violating country start 
referring to the norm—in this case, participatory constitution-making—and begin 
making tactical concessions and reference to it in political rhetoric, they will sooner 
or later have to start to make behavioral changes as well. In a sense, they will become 
entangled in their own rhetoric making it difficult not to follow up “talk” with rule-
consistent behavior.70 Taken together, from the stage of local initiative, to 
adaptation, and lastly to amplification and universality, the norm is incrementally 
acknowledged and adopted in the norm-recipient country which in turn facilitates 
its institutionalization.71
These separate stages of the localization process set aside, the fact still remains 
that in some contexts external norms are simply more difficult to forge than in other 
contexts; sometimes the process of norm diffusion is more challenging and 
sometimes the incremental process as displayed above does not occur. Why is this 
so? According to Checkel, Cortell, and Davis, as well as Shaffer, it is, in a sense, a 
68.  Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms Into 
Domestic Practices: Introduction, in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND 
DOMESTIC CHANGE 1, 13-14 (Thomas Risse et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1999). 
69.  Id. at 15. 
70.  Id. at 20. 
71.  Id. at 17. 
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matter of cultural match.72 In order for external norms, or transnational legal norms 
in keeping with Shaffer’s terminology, to have an impact, they must resonate with 
domestic norms and domestic understandings.73 In contexts where the transnational 
legal norm is in agreement with prevailing cultural and institutional norms, it is more 
likely to diffuse than in contexts in which this agreement is absent. Also, and 
perhaps equally important, the question of whether or not norm diffusion is 
successful depends on local power hierarchies and how incumbent persons in 
government positions as well as members of the political opposition believe that 
the norm in question will help them advance their own agendas and objectives. In 
the context of constitution-making processes, this aspect of agency is likely all but 
irrelevant. If current power-holders suspect that by opening up the process for 
public input, a new institutional order that undermines their positions will see the 
dawn of day, they may be quite reluctant to give the general public this opportunity. 
Difficulties to institutionalize and internalize a norm can also be challenging if 
citizens in a given country are not adequately informed about the benefits of the 
reform in question. Hence, even though they might benefit by it, they might still 
resist it due to poor information.74 Hence, the obstacles of norm institutionalization 
and, even more so, norm internalization can be substantial. At this point it becomes 
relevant to make an analytical distinction between the two, because while 
institutionalization is a necessary condition for successful norm diffusion, it is not 
a sufficient condition.75 For norm diffusion to be successful, institutionalization 
must be followed by internalization which, again, puts the issue of agency at the 
front and center of attention.76 It is in this context that the notion of capabilities
becomes central, and more specifically, an individual’s “capability to function” as 
referred to by Alldén.77
Capabilities 
The capabilities approach is perhaps most commonly associated with Sen and 
focuses on the quality of life that individuals are actually able to achieve.78 One could 
say that the approach centers on learning an individual’s understanding of how 
satisfied she/he is with what she/he does, but also on what the person in question is 
in a position to do. It is the latter aspect of the approach that is of relevance when 
we try to understand how a transnational norm can become internalized. To place 
72.  Shaffer, supra note 11; Jeffrey T. Checkel, International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the 
Rationalist-Constructivist Divide, 3 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 403, 473-95 (1997); Andrew P. Cortell & James W. 
Davis Jr., Understanding the Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research Agenda, 2 INT’L STUD. REV.
65, 73-76 (2000). 
73.  Shaffer, supra note 11. 
74.  Paul Collier, Post-Conflict Recovery: How Should Policies Be Distinctive, 18 J. AFR. ECON. 99 (Supp. 
1 2009). 
75.  Alldén, supra note 17. 
76.  Id. at 13. 
77.  Id. at 30-31. 
78.  AMARTYA SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES (2014). 
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this idea in the context of constitution-making would imply that an individual, to be 
able to effectively participate in the making of his/hers country’s constitution, must 
be equipped with the relevant skills in order to be able to do so; that is, the person 
must be capable to function in this specific context. As expressed by Robeyns, 
“capabilities are real opportunities to functionings [. . .] such as being literate, being 
well fed, being healthy, being educated, being part of a social network, having a 
decent job and so forth.”79 Hence, these aspects are not primarily important in 
themselves, but more than anything else, important because they enable people to 
be capable to function. Many times, however, a variety of obstructions impede an 
individual’s capability to function, ranging from the social institutions of a given 
country (e.g., the political system, the educational system, etc.), to the social norms 
that exist in a particular country (e.g., religious norms, moral norms, cultural norms, 
etc.), to environmental conditions in a given country/region within a country (e.g., 
lack of physical infrastructure, high levels of violence, etc.).80 Such impediments are 
quite prevalent, particularly in many post-conflict states, which in turn, poses certain 
challenges for the norm of participatory constitution-making to transcend 
institutionalization to also become internalized. Let me illustrate this with some 
empirical examples, starting with the case of Afghanistan. 
When one studies the mandate and the work plan of the Constitutional 
Commission in Afghanistan, one cannot deny the commission’s high ambitions to 
include the Afghan people in the making of the draft which resulted in the 2004 
constitution. The Constitutional Commission was formed, among other reasons: to 
make information about the constitution-making process available to the public for 
the duration of its work; carry out consultations with ordinary Afghan citizens in 
each province of the country as well as with Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran 
regarding what they believed to be important to include in the new constitution; 
receive written constitutional submissions from ordinary Afghans from inside as 
well as outside of the country; analyze the input given through written constitutional 
submissions as well as oral statements; produce a draft; and disseminate and educate 
people on the draft constitution.81 Though the aspirations of the constitutional 
commission were noble, to properly engage the Afghan citizens proved to be 
challenging due to a number of reasons. For one, it turned out to be difficult to 
include people, engage people, and gather ideas from people when they had not 
received constitutional education prior to the commission setting out to solicit their 
views.82 Indeed, for people to be able to genuinely participate, they must first of all 
79.  Ingrid Robeyns, Sen’s Capability Approach and Feminist Concerns, in THE CAPABILITY
APPROACH: CONCEPTS, MEASURES AND APPLICATIONS 82 100, 84 (Flavio Comim et al. eds., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 2008). 
80.  Id. at 84-85. 
81.  The Secretariat of the Constitutional Commission of Afghanistan, The Constitution-Making 
Process in Afghanistan (Mar. 10, 2003); U.N. Development Programme, Constitutional Assistance in Post-
Conflict Countries: The UN Experience: Cambodia, East Timor & Afghanistan at 19 (June, 2005) (by Michele 
Brandt). 
82.  Brandt, supra note 81, at 19. 
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have a good understanding of the issue(s) that they are to participate in voicing their 
opinion about. In Afghanistan, the illiteracy rate was a huge obstacle to genuine 
participation, as was poor infrastructure (it was difficult for the commissions to 
physically transport themselves to all provinces of the country as their mandate 
stipulated them to do), as were prevailing social norms that made it difficult to 
engage women in particular.83 Hence, a number of circumstances made it difficult 
for people to acquire the needed capabilities necessary for the norm to transcend 
institutionalization to also become internalized. Perhaps this also explains why 
constitution-making in Afghanistan remained a quasi-endeavor from a public 
participation perspective.  
The same type of circumstances prevailed in East Timor when this country 
embarked on, what was supposed to be, a participatory constitution-making process 
following the vote for independence in 1999.84 Here as well, the East Timorese were 
not extended the opportunity to acquire the necessary skills in order to be able to 
genuinely participate.85 The United Nations Transitional Administration in East 
Timor (UNTAET) carried out a civic education campaign, but it did not include 
education on constitutional issues. Hence, when the Constitutional Commission 
conducted hearings throughout the country in order to gather suggestions from the 
population, it was difficult for the general public to provide informed input. Adding 
to these unfavorable circumstances, the opportunity for the public to comment on 
the proposed draft constitution was also severely circumscribed, as it was published 
in Portuguese, which not everyone in the population reads and speaks. In some 
sense, the opportunity for norm internalization was lost in East Timor when the 
United Nations Security Council, on repeated occasions, chose to disregard the East 
Timorese civil society organization’s plea for sufficient time and resources in order 
to be able to first inform and educate the citizenry, to then include them in a 
genuinely participatory constitution-making process.86 The two empirical examples 
of East Timor and Afghanistan can be contrasted with the Eritrean and South 
African experiences of public participation in constitution-making. 
Eritrea, to begin with, faced numerous challenges to ensure full participation 
in its 1994–1997 constitution-making process—much like the challenges faced in 
both Afghanistan and in East Timor. Through a range of different measures, 
however, the Constitutional Commission in Eritrea managed to overcome many of 
these obstacles and by so doing, it was successful in equipping parts of the Eritrean 
citizenry with the necessary capabilities to be able to effectively participate in the 
making of their country’s constitution.87
83.  Id.
84.  Id. at 8-9. 
85.  See, e.g., Saati, supra note 5. 
86.  Brandt, supra note 81, at 9. 
87.  See, e.g., Bereket Habte Selassie, Constitution Making in Eritrea: A Process-Driven Approach, in
FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION: CASE STUDIES IN CONSTITUTION MAKING, 57, 62-
70 (Laurel E. Miller & Louis Aucoin eds., 2010). 
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The mandate of the Constitutional Commission in Eritrea was, just as the 
mandate of the constitutional commission in Afghanistan, quite ambitious. Its 
members were to: (i) organize and manage a wide-ranging and all-embracing 
national debate, an education campaign with public seminars, and a lecture series 
on constitutional principles and practice; and (ii) organize and conduct—or to cause 
to be organized and conducted by the appropriate bodies—seminars, symposia, 
educational lectures, and discussions on constitutional principles and practices.88
These efforts were to be done through the mass media and they were to be aimed 
at educational and civic establishments as well as other appropriate institutions. The 
difference between the Eritrean case and the cases of Afghanistan and East Timor 
is, however, that these institutionalized promises made their way into actual 
practices. Over a period of three years, Eritreans within the borders of the country 
as well as the diaspora community were involved in the constitution-making 
process.89 Constitutional education programs were held in all languages spoken in 
the country. Measures for reaching the illiterate were also taken, as were non-
traditional forms of outreach, among other things, conveying the principles of 
constitutionalism through puppet shows, poetry sessions, and storytelling 
arrangements.90 Questionnaires, contests and debates on the radio and television 
were also part of the civic education programs, which reached approximately 
500,000 people out of a population of 4.5 million.91 Hence, the Eritrean population 
were much better equipped with the necessary skills to be able to participate in their 
country’s constitution-making process compared to the general public in East 
Timor and in Afghanistan. In Eritrea, they were, in other words, more capable to 
function in the specific context of constitution-making. Now, the fact that the 
constitution that emanated from this highly participatory process was never 
enacted—and to this day remains on the shelf—is actually a separate matter. As far 
as ensuring that ordinary Eritreans were able to participate in the making of the 
constitution in an informed manner, the process was undeniably a fairly successful 
endeavor.92
South Africa is another empirical example of public participation in practice 
where the population have been extended the necessary capabilities to effectively 
engage in the making of the constitution.93 What is important to note, however, is 
that the South African constitution-making process was a two-step endeavor in 
88.  Proclamation No. 55/1994: A Proclamation to Provide for the Establishment of the 
Constitutional Commission. 
89.  Selassie, supra note 87, at 60. 
90.  Id. at 67. 
91.  Id. at 67-68. 
92.  Compare Bereket Habte Selassie, Constitution Making in Eritrea: A Process-Driven Approach, in
FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION: CASE STUDIES IN CONSTITUTION MAKING, 57, 67-
68, with Saati, supra note 5 (illustrating nineteen other cases of participatory constitution-making 
processes).
93.  See, e.g., Hassen Ebrahim and Laurel E. Miller, Creating the Birth Certificate of a New South 
Africa: Constitution Making after Apartheid, in FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION: CASE
STUDIES IN CONSTITUTION MAKING, 111, 112 (Laurel E. Miller with Louis Aucoin eds., 2010). 
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which the first phase of the process was completely elite driven without public 
participation.94 Let me linger a bit at this particular constitution-making process 
since it has, and continues to, receive a lot of attention from the scholarly 
community as well as by practitioners in the field. 
As just stated, the South African process was divided into two separate steps. 
During the first stage of the process, negotiations between all major political parties 
produced an interim constitution with guidelines for the transitional period from 
the system of apartheid to a democratic order.95 The interim constitution was to 
guide the political life of the country while a permanent constitution was being 
drafted, and it was to be replaced by the adoption of the new one. Eventually, talks 
between the main players resulted in an agreement covering thirty-four 
“constitutional principles.”96 These were included in the interim constitution and 
were also required to be incorporated in the final constitution.97 In the second stage 
of the process, a popularly elected Constitutional Assembly was established to create 
and adopt a final constitution.98 Although the mandate of the assembly granted it 
sole responsibility to formulate the constitution on its own, its members were 
convinced that public involvement in the process was necessary to assure the 
legitimacy of the final product.99 An additional mechanism was inserted into the 
formal rules of procedure: a constitutional court was created that, in addition to its 
ordinary tasks, was mandated to oversee the final document to ensure that it 
conformed to the thirty-four principles that had been agreed upon during the first 
stage of the process.100 A constitutional committee drawn from the members of the 
Constitutional Assembly was established after elections in April 1994.101
The commission envisioned three broad phases for the entire process. The 
first step would involve the participation of the public and the writing of a draft 
text. In the second stage, the draft would be published and circulated for further 
input from the people. During the final stage, the constitution would be negotiated 
and adopted by the constitutional assembly.102 Because the members of the 
constitutional assembly were aware of the fact that a large portion of the South 
African public was composed of illiterate rural residents with no access to electronic 
media, they understood the importance of education programs to raise 
consciousness about these issues.103 The Commission agreed that the best approach 
94.  Baleka Mbete-Kgositsile, The Principal Actors in the South-African Constitution-Making Process,
in CONSTITUTION-MAKING AND DEMOCRATISATION IN AFRICA 25, 25-30 (Goran Hyden & Denis 
Venter eds., Afr. Inst. of S. Afr. 2001); Haysom, supra note 63. 
95.  Haysom, supra note 63, at 94-95. 
96.  Id. at 102. 
97.  Ebrahim & Miller, supra note 63, at 121. 
98.  Id.
99.  Mbete-Kgositsile, supra note 94, at 106; Ebrahim & Miller, supra note 63. 
100.  Haysom, supra note 63, at 102. 
101.  Ebrahim & Miller, supra note 63. 
102.  Id. at 129; Haysom, supra note 63; Mbete-Kgositsile, supra note 94. 
103.  Ebrahim & Miller, supra note 63, at 134. 
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would be to carry out constitutional education before soliciting public input, and to 
continue with education programs during the second stage of the process as well.  
During the first phase of the public participation program, a media campaign 
was launched.104 Other measures included advertisements on television and radio 
and in local newspapers.105 The Assembly ordered a national survey to assess the 
impact of the media campaign, the results of which showed that 65 percent of all 
adult South Africans had been reached by the campaign.106 However, it also showed 
that the public was dubious about the intention of the assembly to really take their 
input into account.107 The survey also indicated the continued need for education 
programs.108 To this end, and for the purpose of ensuring the process’s credibility 
in the eyes of the public, the constitutional assembly created additional measures 
for communication.109 A newsletter, television program, radio program, website and 
a talk-line— all of which were entitled “Constitution Talks”—were launched.110 The 
newsletter provided exhaustive information about the constitution making process 
and one hundred thousand copies were distributed every fortnight through taxi 
ranks.111 Another sixty thousand copies were sent to subscribers. The setup of the 
television shows was designed so that members of civil society could question 
assembly members from different political parties about their views on human 
rights, separation of powers, etc.  
Because many South Africans did not have a television or computer, the radio 
was one of the most important and effective mediums for public outreach. The 
assembly cooperated with the South African Broadcasting Corporation and 
launched a weekly radio program that was broadcasted on eight different stations in 
eight different languages.112 These radio programs reached approximately ten 
million South Africans each week.113
The communication process during the first phase of the public participation 
program was also structured to enable the public to provide feedback. The assembly 
arranged public hearings, public meetings and participatory workshops in order to 
solicit submissions from the people.114 All oral submissions were recorded and 
subsequently translated for the members of the assembly to take into 
consideration.115 In absolute numbers, a total of 20,549 people and representatives 
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from 717 civil society organizations attended the public meetings.116 By the end, 
two million submissions had been written by the South African public and sent to 
the Assembly.117 Over 4.5 million copies of the working draft were distributed 
across the country; the media campaign continued, and now also included a booklet 
titled “Constitutions, democracy and a Summary of the Working Draft,” which 
contained information about constitutions and the constitution building process.  
For the second time, the public was invited to share their comments and views, 
this time on the provisions in the working draft. Two hundred fifty thousand 
submissions were collected during this second stage.118 Once the submissions were 
reviewed, the Assembly prepared a revised edition of the draft.119 A copy of the 
revised draft was subsequently sent to each person who had made a submission. As 
stipulated in the rules of procedure, after it had been approved by the constitutional 
assembly, the negotiated working draft was sent to the constitutional court, so that 
it could verify that it corresponded to the thirty-four constitutional principles. The 
court ruled that the draft did not fully comply with all of them, so it was referred 
back to the assembly for revision.120 It was subsequently revised by the 
constitutional assembly, and sent back to the constitutional court, which certified 
that the amended text was in keeping with the thirty-four mandatory principles.121
To be sure, the South African experience of participatory constitution-making 
stands in stark contrast to the experiences of Afghanistan and East Timor. In South 
Africa, it is clear that substantial efforts were made by the constitutional assembly 
and the constitutional commission to properly prepare the South African 
population so that they could in fact genuinely participate in the making of their 
founding laws. I have argued elsewhere, that it appears that the increasing power 
and strength of the “participation-norm” in constitution-making processes is being 
nourished by the South African case.122 And indeed, this case was impressive in 
terms of the many avenues through which people were able to get involved in the 
process; there is no denying this fact. Nonetheless, in the somewhat idealized story 
that has developed around the South African process, it is often “forgotten,” or at 
least not mentioned— that the participatory elements of the process were preceded 
by elite negotiations on the highest political level. As mentioned above, it was after 
the South African political elites had reached consensus on a number of contentious 
constitutional issues that the South African population at large was invited to 
participate, and even when the people had done so, final authority over the content 
of the constitution was still not directly vested in their hands. 
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The purpose of directing attention to the four empirical examples of 
Afghanistan, East Timor, Eritrea, and South Africa is to show that participation in 
practice differs immensely from one context to the other and that we may start to 
understand the reason behind these differences by making an analytical distinction 
between norm institutionalization and norm internalization. Indeed, as these 
empirical examples illustrate, it is one thing to provide a right (to participate in the 
making of one’s constitution), and another for individuals to be able to actually 
access that right (to have the capability to really participate). Moving from norm 
institutionalization to norm internalization, in the context of participatory 
constitution-making, can be eased by a number of different measures among which 
awareness raising for (particularly) marginalized groups who have traditionally been 
excluded from the political arena entirely, is one. Judging by the empirical examples 
above, however, the carrying out of various types of constitutional education programs
before, during, and perhaps even after the constitution-making process, stands out 
as a particularly effective measure for this specific norm to move beyond 
institutionalization to also become internalized.123
CONCLUSIONS
Whether or not transnational norms, be they legal, political or social, diffuse 
into a specific domestic arena can certainly depend on a variety of different reasons, 
and the answer to why successful norm diffusion has occurred in one context and 
not the other will invariably differ. In cases of norm diffusion from above, the issue 
of cultural mismatch should not be downplayed, especially if it is a case of norm 
enforcement which would make it difficult, if not entirely impossible, for domestic 
actors to try to reconstruct the norm so that it can become harmonized with already 
existing local norms, institutions and beliefs. At the same time, the issue of cultural 
match should not be overemphasized as the most important factor, or our default 
explanandum, for why transnational norms diffuse successfully or not.  
It is easy, and perhaps also convenient, to become entangled in a post-colonial 
line of reasoning that points out international organizations and institutes as 
culturally ignorant enforcers of western norms that simply do not find resonance in 
countries outside of what we perceive to be the West. This, however, appears to be 
a one-dimensional analysis that does not likely resonate with reality—but then again, 
it depends on the norm in question. If one takes for granted that enjoying political 
rights is a natural component of an individual’s life, then the norm of participatory 
constitution-making should not be regarded as an alien concept to nations outside 
of the West. This is not to say that people must necessarily exercise this right, but 
that they should have the possibility, and capability, to do so should it be decided 
that their country is to embark on a participatory constitution-making process.  
123.  See id., for a discussion on the importance of constitutional education programs and their 
sequencing where the comparison of twenty cases of participatory constitution-making processes 
illustrate the relevance of these types of programs, particularly, in the early phases of the process before 
setting out to solicit input from the general public. 
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Here, again, the matter of capabilities becomes central. Though it is seldom, if 
at all, discussed in the literature on participation in political decision-making in 
general and in constitution-making in particular, it must be acknowledged that 
participation may not always be problem free; that it might potentially have dark 
sides as well. Public participation in the making of the constitution, which is 
envisioned to promote dialogue and consensus between former adversaries of 
violent conflict,124 might also—at least on a theoretical level—bring about the 
precise opposite: increased polarization between different groups in society. This 
risk is more imminent if some individuals/some segments of the population are 
better positioned to participate in terms of being more educated, more familiar with 
the workings of the political system and more used to participate in various 
deliberative forums; i.e., more capable to function in the context of constitution-
making. Hence, in order to decrease the possibility of increased polarization 
between various groups in society, it might be worthwhile to carefully consider how 
constitutional education programs can be designed such to suit different segments 
of the population based on their previous level of knowledge so that the possibilities 
of participating on an equal basis at least increases.  
Another potential dark side of public participation in the making of the 
constitution is that it increases people’s expectations of having their input reflected 
in the final draft. When/if these expectations are not met, frustration might follow 
which can lead to violence. With this potential risk in mind, it might be a sound idea 
to investigate if public participation in the making of the constitution can be 
sequenced to junctures that are more suitable for involvement. Though this is an 
issue that deserves further systematic empirical research before any general 
suggestions can be made, the South African experience is valuable in terms of at 
least starting a discussion on how these processes can be sequenced and if it is a 
sound idea to allow the first stage of the process to be limited to negotiations 
between political elites and the following stage/stages to be open to public input. 
Again, however, this is a field of research that must be probed further—and perhaps 
this is where our attention needs to be as we move forth investigating participatory 
constitution-making so that potential perils are avoided, while institutionalization 
and internalization are facilitated. 
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